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EDITORIAL NOTES
band, on the ground of fraud in effecting a separation for the
purpose of making the conveyance, is expressly referred to as
an open question. However, in an earlier case," it has been held
that a conveyance made by a husband and wife in order to prevent
an existing judgment from attaching in the future as a lien on the
husband's curtesy interest could not be attacked as fraudulent
after the death of the wife. This decision is based on the ground
that the husband had no interest to which the lien attached at
the time of the conveyance, that the conveyance defeated the con-
tingency upon which the curtesy interest otherwise would have
vested, and hence that the intent with which the conveyance was
made was immaterial. In other words, there could be no fraud
.n defeating a contingent attachment of the lien, a bare possi-
bility, although evidently the very act by which the contingency
was defeated was permeated with an intent which would have
been fraudulent if the husband had had a vested interest. If the
husband and wife can not be guilty of fraud with reference to
third parties in the matter of defeating the possibility of eurtesy,
on the ground that the husband has no interest which may be
the subject of fraud with reference to the husband's creditors,
it may very plausibly be argued that, for the same reason, the
wife can not be guilty of fraud with reference to the husband.
If the wife and husband together can legitimately destroy the con-
tingency upon which the lien would attach; why can not the -wife
alone, as far as fraud is concerned, destroy the contingency upon
which the curtesy would vest? Logically, it would seem that a
husband could make no more substantial objection, on the solh
ground of fraud, to a conveyance of his wife depriving him of
Iis possibility of curtesy than could a prospective heir make a
conveyance exeeuted for the purpose of defeating his inheritance.
-L. C.
APPORTIONMENT OF RoyAIEmS ON SUBDIVISION OF PREMISES SUB-
JECT TO AN OIL AND GAS LEASE UNDER WHICH THERE IS SuBsE-
QUENT DEVELOPMENT.-In the recent case of Pittsburgh & West
Virginia Gas Co. v. Ankrom et al.," the Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia held that where a tract of land, subject to an
"Guernsey ,. Lazear, note 4, supra.
197 S. E. 593 (1918). Judges Poffenbarger and Williams dissented. All the
prior cases on this point are cited in the opinions in this case and in the opinion
in the Oklahoma case discussed hereafter.
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oil and gas lease under which there had been no development, is
subdivided as to ownership without mention of the royalties, the
owner of each part takes it subject to the oil and gas lease, and if
oil or gas is later discovered and produced under the lease, such
owner will be entitled to all the royalties from oil or gas produced
from wells on his portion. This decision is in accord with the
weight of authority and apparently overrules the case of Campbell
v. Lynch2 in which it was held that where the ownership of land
subject to an oil and gas lease was divided among tenants in com-
mon by partition before development for oil and gas, the royalties
on oil and gas subsequently produced under the lease should be
divided among the owners of all the parts in proportion to the
areas of such parts, regardless of the location of the producing
wells. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma has also recently adopted
the majority view on this point."  It is of interest to note the
reasons upon which these courts base their decisions.
Two of the reasons given by the Oklahoma court do not seem to
have been suggested in prior cases. The first is that since the
particular oil and gas lease involved in the suit contained pro-
visions to the effect that the conditions and agreements contained
therein should extend to the heirs: executors, administrators, suc-
cessors and assigns of both parties, a right to subdivide the land
may fairly be implied. It is probable that no authority can be
found for such an implication and as the parties certainly had a
clear purpose in using this language such an implication is not
reasonable. As a second reason the court states that it has been
the general, if not the universal, custom in the state since the
discovery of oil and gas, to pay the royalties to the owner of the
land on which the wells were located and from which the produc-
tion was had. If the court means that this has been the custom
where ownership of land subject to an oil and gas lease has been
divided prior to development, then there is doubtless considerable
foundiation for the statement, but it may be doubted whether there
is such a custom so general as to justify the court in taking judicial
notice of it.,
281 W. Va. 379, 94 ,S. E. 739 (1918). Por brief discussions of this decision,
see 25 M% VA. L, Q. 231, 337.
3KImbley v. Luckey, 179 Pae. 928 (Okla. 1919). This decision was followed
about two months later in Pierce Oil Corporation v. Schlacht, 181 Pac. 731
(Okla. 1919).
'The writer has been informed by practicing attorneys in this state that prior
to Campbell v. Lynch it was generally understood 'that each man was entitled
2
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The chief ground on which both the Oklahoma and the West
Virginia cases seem to be based is that the vendee of the lessor of
the oil and gas got all the interest which the lessor had in that
portion of the land conveyed to such vendee, and this included
the right to all the oil and gas which might be extracted from
such land, subject only to the right of the oil and gas lessee to ex-
plore for and produce oil and gas. As to this existing lease the
vendee would get, not a right to a proportionate share of all the
oil and gas which might be produced on all land covered by the
lease, but to all royalties from oil and gas produced by the lessee
from wells on the vendee's land. The West Virginia court said:
" . hen these defendants purchased their respective par-
cels of land from the trustee in bankruptcy they bought all of the
estate therein, subject only to the right of the plaintiff to explore
for and produce oil and gas. This right which is conferred upon
the lessee is exactly the same that would have existed in these
purchasers had there been no lease, from which it necessarily fol-
lows that the owner of each subdivision is entitled to the royalties
on all of the oil produced from the wells drilled on his sub-
division." This certainly seems to be in accord with legal prin-
ciples' It is certainly difficult to justify on legal principle a hold-
ing that because B acquired one-fourth of a tract of land subject
to an oil and gas lease (which it seems was not considered of suffi-
cient importance to cause the parties to insert in the conveyance
a provision as to royalties) he thereby secured a right to one-
fourth of all the royalties the whole tract might thereafter pro-
duce. As was said by the West Virginia court in the case above
mentioned: "It would no doubt result in some of the defendants
receiving part of the royalties for oil which was extracted from
lands at a distance of more than a mile from lands owned by them,
and which could by no stretch of the imagination be taken to have
been produced from their lands." It is apparent that the only
justification for the rule stated in Campbell v. Lynch is, that under
to the royalties from all oil and gas produced from his land and that royalties had
frequently been so divided in similar cases without any question being raised.
In West Virginia where the landowner owns the oil and gas in place the rule
laid down in Campbell v. Lynch is illogical because 'the oil extracted from the land
belongs to the owner of that land before it is brought to the surface, yet a share
of it is given to owners of other lands ,twho have no interest in the land producing
the mineral. In Oklahoma, the landowner does not actually own the oil and gas
in place but as owner of that particular area he does have the exclusive right to
take oil and gas from that area and this right is attached to every part of the
land. Consequently the minority rule is also illogical here.
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the lease the lessee happened to have the right to develop the
land as one leasehold and solely because of this fact it is assumed
that the parties intended (by reason of silence on the point) to
share the royalties produced from the leased premises in propor-
tion to the area of the subdivisions and regardless of whether oil
and gas could be produced from any considerable portion of the
leasehold.8 The inference as to their intent is based not on the
language of the instrument they execute, but on an instrument
(oil and gas lease) executed by other parties at a prior time, the
existence of which was probably forgotten. The rule would ap-
parently apply to a case where the vendee did not know there was
an existing oil and gas lease.
It is submitted that the rule laid down by the cases under con-
3ideration is not only sound but is also for the best interests of
the business concerned. It is improbable that any great hardship
ean result from the fact that the parties neglect specially to men-
tion these royalties unless the sub divisions are very small. It is
only fair to give the owner of a subdivision the right to bring suit
in case the lessee fails to develop diligently the premises as a whole.
He should also be permitted to seek the aid of the courts to pre-
vent drainage of his lands from lands not included in the lease.
There seems to be no good reason why such rights should not be
given to him and if he has such rights there can be a substantial
hardship only in case part of his land is drained by the lessee in
properly developing the leased premises for oil and gas, and even
here the lessee ought to be compelled to act in good faith though
he could probably not be compelled to develop all the subdivisions
as if they were separate and distinct leases.
Has the lessee a right to object to being compelled to pay royal-
ties to the owners of subdivisions under the majority rule? In
none of the cases which have arisen so far has any objection been
6The argument that the majority rule Is unjust seems chiefly based on cases
which it is feared may arise, rather than on any actual case which has arisen
where the application of the rule would work any great injustice. It is submitted
that there can be no great Injustice except where the oil and gas Is drained from
one subdivision by wells located on another. To what extent equity can prevent
such drainage is for the court to determine If such a case ever arises. Certainly
the fact that such a case may arise sometime is not sufficient cause for over-
throwing what has -been long understood to be the law and substituting for it the
rule laid down in Campbell v. Lynch, which apparently requires the decision of
a court of equity in every case to determine how the royiltles should be appor-
tioned. See W. Va. L. Q. 232. One great merit In the majority rule Is that
the parties themselves can determine who is entitled to the Iroyalties in nearly
every case without resort to litigation. Under the minority rule this can be finally
determined only ,by the hightst court of the jurisdiction.
4
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made by the lessee, and so it is probable that this rule imposes no
great hardship on him.
-J. W. S.
W-I-El BY A STATE, OF THE RIGHT TO REGuLTUTE RATE.-AS the
regulation of rates charged by public utilities is admittedly a
governmental function-a function generally regarded as an exer-
cise of the police power of the state--there is obviously a grave, if
not vital, objection to holding that a state by its legislature may
ever waive the right to exercise this fundamental, governmental
power. Thus, it is well-settled law that neither the state, nor a
municipal corporation to which the state has delegated its powers,
can by contract waive the right to exercise those police powers
which protect the health, safety, or morals of the public. 2 May a
state, then, waive its right to exercise the allied power to regulate
rates?
Upon this point the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
has held that this power-a police power-is so fundamentally
governmental and that the right to exercise it at all times is so
vital to the essential interests of the public and so dependent upon
changing conditions that any attempt by the state legislature to
relinquish the right is ineffectual." Hence, according to this view,
any alleged contract, purporting to be authorized by the state
directly through its legislature or indirectly through a municipal-
ity to the effect that rates thus fixed by the state or municipality
are not to be changed for a stipulated time, is not a valid contract,
and, therefore, any subsequent regulation of the rate by the state
is not an impairment of the obligation of a contract in contraven-
tion of the federal Constitution.4 Upon principle it is submitted
that the above-mentioned 'iew of the West Virginia court is sound;
but unfortunately the United States Supreme Court seems to
'Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1876) ; Union Dry Goods Co. 'v. Georgia Public
Service Corporation, 248 U. S. 372 (1919) City of Benwood et al. v. Public Service
Commission, 75 W. Va. 127, 83 S. E. 295 (1914). But see William Draper Lewis,
"Constitutional Questions Involved in the Commodity Clause of the Hepburn Act,
21 HAly. L. REv. 595, 609.
2Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25 (1877); -Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S,
814 (1879) City of Petersburg v. Petersburg Aqueduct Co., 102 Va. 654, 47 S. E,
848 (1904); see FREUND, PoIsCE PowER, §§ 24, 362.
3Laurel Fork & Sand Hill R. R. Co. v. West Virginia Transportation Co., 25 W. Va,
324 (1884).
'Article I, § 10.
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